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Comment

Whistle While You Work: The Fairytale-Like
Whistleblower Provisions of the Dodd-Frank
Act and the Emergence of "Greedy,"
the Eighth Dwarf

I.

INTRODUCTION

The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (the
Act)' is arguably the most sweeping and significant expansion of
financial regulatory reform since the Great Depression.2 The Act,
stimulated by Congress's perceived failures of government banking
regulations, is intended to promote financial stability in the United
States. Amidst the Act's thousands of pages are a handful of sections
that significantly enhance the awards and protections available to
whistleblowers.' Among other things, the Dodd-Frank Act's whistle-

1. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
2. John L. Ropiequet, Christopher S. Naveja & Jason B. Hirsh, An Introductionto the
Dodd-FrankAct-the New Regulatory Structurefor Consumer FinanceEmerges, 29 No. 8
BANKING & FIN. SERVICES POL'Y REP. 1, 1 (2010).
3. 124 Stat. at 1376.
4. See §§ 748, 922, 1057, 124 Stat. at 1739-46, 1841-49, 2031-35.
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blower bounty provisions and protections gives a hefty award to
whistleblowers, strengthens and expands the whistleblower protections
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (Sarbanes-Oxley), creates an entirely
new retaliation-protection regime, and provides for new private rights of
action for whistleblowers under the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934
(SEA)6 and the Commodity Exchange Act of 1936 (CEA going forward.
These whistleblower provisions will have both immediate and long-term
effects on employees, companies, lawyers, and federal courts.
This Comment's purpose is threefold. First, this Comment canvasses
the history of federal law whistleblower provisions and discusses the
financial climate that stimulated the passage of the Dodd-Frank Act.
Second, this Comment considers the whistleblower provisions and
protections afforded by the Dodd-Frank Act and compares them to prior
legislative provisions. Third, this Comment explores the likelihood that
the Act's whistleblower provisions will achieve their intended goals and
the potential for unintended and undesirable consequences.
II.

WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTION PRIOR TO THE DODD-FRANK ACT

The term "whistleblower" originated from the practice of English
constables, or bobbies, who blew their whistles to alert other constables
that help was needed.' Over time this simple concept has grown into
an omnipresent force within government or corporate walls governed by
federal statutes to now describe an employee externally reporting
fraudulent actions of the employer-company to the federal government.'
While blowing the whistle on a company affects all parties involved, it
is nevertheless an "individual decision" and "[a] corporate employee who
discovers ongoing fraudulent conduct (either by accident or through
deliberate search) must make an affirmative choice to blow the
whistle."10 Accordingly, this choice has proven to be difficult; however,
with the financial incentives and protection that the Dodd-Frank Act
provides, the choice will now likely be an easier one to make."

5. Sarbanex-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in
scattered sections of 15 and 18 U.S.C.), amended by §§ 922, 929A, 124 Stat. at 1842, 1852.
6. 15 U.S.C. ch. 2B (2006 & Supp. 2009), amended by § 922, 124 Stat. at 1841.
7. 7 U.S.C. ch. 1 (2006 & Supp. 2008), amended by § 748, 124 Stat. at 1739.
8. Who Qualifies as a SEC Whistleblower?, SEC Whistleblower Program, httpJ/www
.secwhistleblowerprogram.org/SEC-Whistleblower-Qualifications (last visited Apr. 2,2011).
9.

BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 1734 (9th ed. 2009).

10. Geoffrey Christopher Rapp, Beyond Protection:InvigoratingIncentivesfor SarbanesOxley Corporate and SecuritiesFraud Whistleblowers, 87 B.U. L. REV. 91, 111 (2007).
11. Id. at 113.
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The Dodd-Frank Act is not the only legislation enacted by Congress
protecting whistleblowers. Some federal statutes award the whistleblower with a percentage of the monetary sanction imposed on the
violating agency.12 Other federal statutes award successful whistleblower retaliation claims to reinstatement, back pay, injunctive relief,
and compensatory damages,a and still some provide for punitive
This dichotomous protection leads to two main goals of
damages.'
federal whistleblower statutes. 5 First, whistleblower protection should
"'serve a truth-advancing function' . . . to encourage ... employees to
share [information] about ...

fraud committed by their respective

agencies."l And second, whistleblower protection serves a "democracyadvancing function" to make the government "more transparent" and
therefore "more responsive to the people.""
However, to completely understand the effect of the whistleblower
provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act,' it should be viewed first in light of
the protections that prior statutes afforded whistleblowers. Some of the
most notable whistleblower incentives or protections that were existent
prior to the Dodd-Frank Act were included within the SEA,' the False
Claims Act,20 and Sarbanes-Oxley.2 1
The Securities and Exchange Act of 1934
The United States Congress created the SEA in order to govern
securities transactions on the secondary market." In doing so, the SEA
rewarded up to 10% of a monetary sanction levied against a company
caught in violation of insider trading to an individual who gave
information to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) regarding

A.

12. E.g., False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(1), (2) (2006).
13. E.g., Energy Reorganization Act, 42 U.S.C. § 5851(bX2XB) (2006).
14. E.g., Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2622(d) (2006); Energy Reorganization Act, 42 U.S.C. § 5851(d) (2006); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7622(d) (2010).
15. Jon Knight, Patrollingthe Unfriendly Skies: Protecting Whistleblowers Through
Expanded Jurisdiction,20 FED. CIR. B.J. 281, 284 (2010).
16. Id. (quoting Jocelyn Patricia Bond, Note, Efficiency Considerationsand the Use of
Taxpayer Resources: An Analysis of Proposed Whistleblower Protection Act Revisions, 19
FED. CIR. B.J. 107, 111 (2009)).
17. Id. at 284-85.
18. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
19. 15 U.S.C. ch. 2B (2006 & Supp. 2009).
20. 31 U.S.C. § 3729-3733 (2006 & Supp. 2009).
21. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in
scattered sections of 15 and 18 U.S.C.).
22. 15 U.S.C. § 78b (2006).
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the violation.23 However, this provision does not require that a
whistleblower receive a portion of the monetary sanction recovered.24
Rather, the SEC has complete discretionary authority over whether to
provide the whistleblower with an award, if at all.2 ' The relatively
small financial reward combined with the discretionary authority of the
SEC to reward the whistleblower has caused the statute to be ineffective.2 6 During the twenty years that this provision has been enacted,
only five individuals have received awards under the program, "totaling
a mere $159,537.""

Therefore, while the SEA provides a recourse for

whistleblowers, it does not provide an incentive.
B.

The False Claims Act
The False Claims Act, however, does provide a stronger incentive to
individuals who report fraud.28 Originally enacted in 1863, the
False Claims Act has been substantially amended on three occasions-1943,o 1986, and 2009.2 In 1986 Congress created the
modem-day False Claims Act by specifically amending the statute to
"encourage more private enforcement suits." 3 The False Claims Act,
with its reliance on qui tam3 4 actions, is "used as the primary vehicle
by the Government for recouping losses suffered through fraud" and, in
2004, was "the Government's most successful weapon in its legal arsenal
to combat fraud." 5

23. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-1(e) (2006).
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Robert R. Stauffer & Andrew D. Kennedy, Dodd-FrankAct PromisesLarge Bounties
for Whistleblowers, LAW.COM (Aug. 23, 2010), http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=12
02470880915.
27. Id.
28. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730.
29. False Claims Act of 1863, ch. 67, 12 Stat. 696.
30. Act of 1943, ch. 377, 57 Stat. 608 (amending the qui tam provisions of the False
Claims Act).
31. False Claims Amendments Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-562, 100 Stat. 3153 (1986).
32. Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-21, 123 Stat. 1617.
33. S. REP. No. 99-345, at 23-24(1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5288-89.
34. Qui tam, the abbreviation of the Latin phrase "'qui tam pro domino rege quam pro
se ipso in hac parte sequitur'. . . means 'who pursues this action on our Lord the King's
behalf as well as his own.'" Rockwell Int'l Corp. v. United States, 549 U.S. 457, 463 n.2
(2007) (emphasis omitted).
35. Dan L. Hargrove, Soldiers of Qui Tam Fortune:Do Military Service Members Have
Standing to File Qui Tam Actions Under the False Claims Act?, 34 PUB. CONT. L.J. 45, 47
(2004) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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A False Claims Act cause of action may be pursued in two ways.
First, "the Attorney General may bring a civil action" against a person
who defrauds the government. 36 The amount of the award given to the
whistleblower, based upon the value of the information received by the
government and determined as part of a settlement or allocated by the
court, is between 15%-25% of any award the government may receive for
pursuing the claim." Second, any individual (relator)" may pursue
the claim on his or her own, qui tam, if the government chooses not to
pursue the claim after sixty days of filing the claim." In this case, the
relator is entitled to 25%-30% of the monetary sanctions, plus attorney
fees and costs.40 It is important to note that the award to whistleblowers under the False Claims Act is not discretionary, but mandatory.41 Finally, the 4 2False Claim Act provides the relator protection
against retaliation.
The False Claims Act award is given to those whistleblowers who are
an "original source."' Congress has defined "original source" under the
False Claims Act as "an individual who has direct and independent
knowledge of the information on which the allegations are based and has
voluntarily provided the information to the Government before filing an
action under this section which is based on the information."" This
narrow definition has been held to include an employee who learns of
and witnesses illegal inducements by a pharmaceutical company to
physicians and pharmacists, 45 but not a past employee who merely
predicts a fraudulent activity because the employee lacks "direct and
independent knowledge of the information upon which [the] allegations
[are] based."'
The False Claims Act was largely unchanged between 1986 and
2009.47 However, in 2009 the Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act,

36. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(a) (2006).
37. Id. § 3730(dX1) (2006).
38. Matthew Titolo, Retroactivity and the FraudEnforement and Recovery Act of 2009,
86 IND. L.J. 257, 265 (2011); see also 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b) (2006).
39. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(2).
40. Id. § 3730(d)(2) (2006).
41. Id. § 3730(dX1), (2).
42. Id. § 3730(h) (2006 & Supp. 2009).

43. Id. § 3730(eX4XA), (B) (2006).
44. Id. § 3730(eX4XB).
45. In re Pharm. Indus. Average Wholesale Price Litig., 538 F. Supp. 2d 367, 384-85
(D. Mass. 2008).
46. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 549 U.S. at 476.
47. Justin P. Tschoepe, A FraudAgainst One is Apparently A FraudAgainst All: The
FraudEnforcement and Recovery Act's Unprecedented Expansion of Liability Under the
False ClaimsAct, 47 Hous. L. REv. 741, 753 (2010).
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among other things," amended the definition of "claim"; the amendment now clarifies "that liability can arise from the submission of a false
claim to anyone who is eventually reimbursed with federal funds,
regardless of the distance between the defendant and the federal
government."" Prior to the amendment, the Supreme Court of the
United States had interpreted the definition of "claim" to not include
attenuated circumstances when a subcontractor makes "a false
statement to a private entity and does not intend the Government to rely
on that false statement as a condition of payment."o Accordingly, this
new definition, as amended by the Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act,
broadens the scope of the False Claims Act."
The Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act also amended the antiretaliation provisions afforded to a relator who brings a qui tam
claim." This amendment broadens the provision by providing individual liability, as well as including contractors and agents within the scope
of the False Claims Act retaliation coverage.
The False Claims Act has awarded whistleblowers with large
With the
monetary awards sometimes worth billions of dollars.'
potential to receive a large monetary award, the False Claim Act has
incentivized employees to report fraudulent violations and, if needed,
pursue them on their own." Indeed, the False Claims Act has remained largely successful. In the 2010 fiscal year, the Department of
Justice recovered $3 billion in False Claims Act cases, with whistleblowers being awarded a total of $385 million dollars.56

C.

The Sarbanes-OxleyAct

Unlike the False Claims Act and the SEA, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
does provide protection for whistleblowers who suffer employment
retaliation.57 In 2002 Congress enacted Sarbanes-Oxley in the wake of
"emerging corporate scandals" such as the WorldCom collapse, and the

48. Id. at 759-60.
49. Id.; see also 123 Stat. at 1622-23.
50. Allison Engine Co. v. United States ex rel. Sanders, 553 U.S. 662, 672 (2008).
51. Tschoepe, supra note 47, at 760.
52. § 4(d), 123 Stat. at 1624-25.
53. Id.
54. See Stauffer & Kennedy, supra note 26.
55. See id.
56. False ClaimsAct Update & Alert: DOJRecovers$3 Billion in FY2010 False Claims
Act Cases, TAXPAYERS AGAINST FRAUD EDUCATION FUND (Nov. 22, 2010), http/www.taf
.org/whistle299.htm.
57. § 806(a), 116 Stat. 745, 802 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a) (2006)).
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"collapse of the 'dot-com bubble,""' which American leaders were afraid
would "cause the complete collapse of the American financial system."'
This act, as part of a financial "'emergency' measure prompt[ed] much
criticism of the legislative process behind its adoption."'o
Pursuant to the enactment, Sarbanes-Oxley provided specific
whistleblower protection against employer retaliation based on the
This anti-retaliation
reporting of securities-related violations. 6 1
provision prohibits employers from taking any retaliatory action against
the whistleblowing employee." In addition to prohibiting companies
from retaliating, Sarbanes-Oxley also entitles an employee who has been
subjected to retaliation to reinstatement, back pay, and legal fees.63
Further, Sarbanes-Oxley signifies a respect for a corporation's internal
reporting mechanisms by requiring that "corporations provide employees
with a standardized channel to report organizational misconduct
internally within the corporation."' However, prior to the Dodd-Frank
Act, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act did not provide any true incentives to
Without
employees to provide information to outside authorities.6
only
Sarbanes-Oxley
whistleblowers,
to
potential
incentives
providing
6
reform."
offer
radical
did
"not
and
in
the
doctrine'"
cracks
"'seal [ed]
Significant to the discussion of Sarbanes-Oxley, is the scope of which
the whistleblower retaliation protection of Sarbanes-Oxley applies,
specifically the scope of the statute's phrase "publicly traded companies." This provision has been interpreted differently by administrative law judges, mainly dividing on whether "contractor, subcontractor,

58. Rapp, supra note 10, at 107. The "Dotcom Bubble" is a "rapid rise in equity
markets fueled by investments in internet-based companies." Dotcom Bubble, INVESTOPEDIA.COM, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/d/dotcom-bubble.asp (last visited May 1, 2011).
59. Rapp, supra note 10, at 107.
60. Id. Most scholars view "[tihe WorldCom collapse as the 'tipping point' at which
congressional action became inevitable." Id. at 107 n.88. Furthermore, the Enron situation
played a substantial role. Id. at 107 n.90.
61. 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a) (2006).
62. Id.
63. Id. § 1514A(c).
64. Rapp, supra note 10, at 115 (internal quotation marks omitted).
65. Id. at 113-14 (suggesting that "[oinly a strong whistleblower law aimed at
generating incentives for corporate insiders to expose fraud can optimize the quantity of
insider information brought into the public domain.").
66. Id.
67. 18 U.S.C. § 1514(A)(a); see also Brent B. Nicholson, The Perilsof Parenthoodand
Other Dangerous Relationships Under the Whistleblower Protection Provision of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 2 ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 415, 432 (2007).
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or agent" is included within the scope of Sarbanes-Oxley."8 Accordingly, this difference in interpretation has led to several differing conclusions and admitted confusion of Sarbanes-Oxley applicability.69
However, for the most part, "publically traded companly]" has been
interpreted in the plain text meaning, thus creating a perceived loophole
of liability for all subsidiaries and affiliates of publically traded
companies.o
The Dodd-Frank Act did not completely amend the SEA, the False
Claims Act, or Sarbanes-Oxley. Rather, the Dodd-Frank Act amended
the SEA, the False Claims Act, and Sarbanes-Oxley, only in part, and
provided alternate forms of action that coincide with portions of the
SEA, the False Claims Act, and Sarbanes-Oxley.
III.

THE DODD-FRANK ACT

It is not unusual for Congress to create and pass an act in the wake
of a national concern or trend. For example, the Whistleblower
Protection Act of 198971 was created in response to an employment
retaliation action taken against Roger Boisjoly, an engineer involved in
building the Challenger Space Shuttle.7 2 When Boisjoly testified before
Congress that he had expressed concerns regarding the design of the
shuttle fuel tanks hours before the deadly launch, he almost immediately
suffered employment retaliation. Unlike the Whistleblower Protection
Act, the Dodd-Frank Act74 was not prompted by one single event, but
the culmination of major economic crises, leading to the 2008 economic
recession.

68. Compare In re Gonzalez, No. 2004-SOX-39, 2004 WL 5840274, at *3 (Dep't of Labor
Aug. 20, 2004) (holding that "Congress intended to provide whistleblower protection to
employees of subsidiaries of publicly traded companies"), with In re Goodman, No. 2006SOX-000111, 2006 WL 3246820, at *5 (Dep't of Labor Jan. 10, 2006) (holding that
Sarbanes-Oxley only applied to employees of publicly traded companies).
69. Compare In re Gonzalez, 2004 WL 5840274, at *3 (holding that "Congress intended
to provide whistleblower protection to employees of subsidiaries of publicly traded
companies"), with In re Goodman, 2006 WL 3246820, at *5 (holding that Sarbanes-Oxley
only applied to employees of publicly traded companies).
70. R. Scott Oswald & Jason Zuckerman, Whistleblower Provisionsof the Dodd-Frank
Act, EMP. L. GROUP (July 20, 2010), http://employmentlawgroup.com/Articles/ROswald
/DoddFrankWhistleblowerProvisions.html.
71. 5 U.S.C. §§ 1201-22 (2006).
72. Knight, supra note 15, at 286.
73.

Id.

74. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
75. SEN. REP. No. 111-176, at 1 (2010).
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Since 2007 the United States and most of the global economy has
suffered, resulting in the collapse of major financial institutions.
Most prominently, the insurance giant, American International Group,
Inc. (AIG), sought a total of $182 billion from the Federal Reserve
making it the biggest federal bailout in United States history.7 In
addition, the securities firm of Merrill Lynch sold itself to Bank of
America, and the securities firm of Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy protection.
In response to these and other economic crises,
Congress passed the Dodd-Frank Act in order "[t]o promote the financial
stability .

.

. by improving accountability and transparency in the

financial system."7 Congress recognized the assistance that whistleblowers provide in uncovering fraud schemes in public companies and
thus created a system to encourage and protect employees.o The Act's
whistleblower provisions are intended to amend, supplement, and, at
times, fix aspects of previous statutory provisions by encouraging
employees to report fraudulent behavior and to protect those employees
who divulge information to the government.8 '
The Dodd-Frank Act includes two primary whistleblower provisions:
1) monetary incentives for whistleblowerB 2 and 2) retaliation protection
against the employer.' Additionally, the Dodd-Frank Act has amended
provisions within Sarbanes-Oxley," the SEA, and the CEA." The

76. Chris Isidore, It's Official: Recession Since Dec. '07, CNN MONEY (Dec. 1, 2008),
http://money.cnn.com/2008/12/01/news/economy/recession/index.htm; see also BUSINESS
CYCLE DATING COMMITTEE, NAT'L BUREAU OF ECON. RESEARCH, DETERMINATION OF THE
DECEMBER 2007 PEAK IN ECONOMIC AcTIVITY, 1, available at http://wwwdev.nber.org/dec
2008.pdf.
77. American International Group Inc. Overview, N.Y. TIMES, http://topics.nytimes
.com/top/news/business/companiestamericanintemational-gouptindex.html?inine=nyt-org
(last visited May 1, 2011).
78. Andrew Ross Sorkin, Lehman Files for Bankruptcy; Merrill is Sold, N.Y. TIMES
(Sept. 14, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/15/business/15lehman.html?page
wanted=all.

79. 124 Stat. at 1376.
80. S. Rep. No. 111-176, at 96 (noting that "54. 1%of uncovered fraud schemes in public
companies" were done by whistleblowers).
81. See S. REP. No. 111-176, at 96.
82. § 922, 124 Stat. at 1842-43.
83. § 922, 124 Stat. at 1845-47.
84. Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in
scattered sections of 15 and 18 U.S.C.), amended by §§ 922, 929A, 124 Stat. at 1842, 1852
(amending scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.).
85. 15 U.S.C. ch. 2B (2006 & Supp. 2009), amended by § 922, 124 Stat. at 1841-49
(amending scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).

86. 7 U.S.C. ch. 1 (2006 & Supp.), amended by § 748, 124 Stat. at 1739-46 (amending
scattered sections of 7 U.S.C.).

1288

MERCER LAW REVIEW

amendments to the SEA are
made to the CEA. Therefore,
amendments will affect the
Futures Trading Commission

[Vol. 62

substantially similar to the amendments
only the areas where the Dodd-Frank Act
SEC and the United States Commodity
(CFTC) will be noted.

A.

Bounty Provisions of the Dodd-FrankAct
The whistleblower bounty provision is similar to the Internal Revenue
Service (IRS) Whistleblower Program in the Tax Relief and Health Care
Act of 2006,7 which mandated a minimum award for successful tips
and led to an increase in the number of received tips regarding violation
of tax laws." In general, the Dodd-Frank Act states that a whistleblower who provides "original information"' of a fraudulent act by a
public or privately held company leading to a monetary sanction of at
least $1 milliono will be rewarded 10%-30% of the monetary sanction."
First, the Dodd-Frank Act requires the SEC and the CFTC to
promulgate rules by which the whistleblower bounty provisions will be
implemented." These rules, of which must be finalized 270 days after
the date of enactment, are, at the time of writing this Comment,
currently only proposed rules by the SEC and CFTC.93 The proposed
rules by the CFTC are "intended to be the same as the [proposed SEC
rules], except where the Dodd-Frank Act required a different result.""
The areas that the proposed rules differ will be noted. The following
analysis of the Dodd-Frank Act takes into account the language of the
Act itself as well as the effect of the proposed rules.
The Dodd-Frank Act defines a "whistleblower" as "any individual who
provides, or 2 or more individuals acting jointly, who provides information relating to a violation of [the securities laws] to the Commission

87. Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-432, § 406, 120 Stat. 2922,
2958-60 (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 7623 (2006)).
88. Jarod S. Gonzalez, A Pot of Gold at the End of the Rainbow: An Economic
Incentives-Based Approach to OSHA Whistleblowing, 14 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J. 325,
342-43 (2010).
89. §§ 748, 922, 124 Stat. at 1740, 1841-42.
90. §§ 748, 922, 124 Stat. at 1740, 1841.
91. §§ 748, 922, 124 Stat. at 1740-41, 1842.
92. §§ 748, 922, 124 Stat. at 1746, 1847-48.
93. § 748, 124 Stat. at 1746.
94. Steve Quinlivin, CFTC Publishes Whistleblower Proposal-DoubleJeopardyfor SEC
Registrants?, LEONARD, STREET, & DEINARD, http://dodd-frank.com/cftc-publishes-whistle
blower-proposal%E2%80%94double-jeopardy-for-sec-registrants/(last visited May 1, 2011).
The CFTC Rules are so similar to the SEC that the CFTC "forgot to change all of the
references in the proposed forms it copied from the SEC" rules. Id.
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Both the SEC and the CFTC's Proposed Rules" add the word

"potential" to the type of violation reported by a whistleblower." With
this addition, the conduct reported by the whistleblower does not have
to actually constitute a violation of the securities laws."
"Original information" as defined in the Dodd-Frank Act is information
"derived from the independent knowledge or analysis of [the] whistleblower," which cannot already be known to the SEC" or CFTC."o
This definition contemplates that knowledge may be "obtained from any
of the whistleblower's experiences, observations, or communications.""o'
As the SEC and CFTC Proposed Rules Description makes clear, this
definition of "independent knowledge . . . best effectuates" Congress's

intentions to reward those individuals who voluntarily come forward
with information if such information leads "to a successful enforcement
action."'o2 With regard to "independent analysis," the Proposed Rules
define this to "mean the whistleblower's own analysis, whether done
alone or in combination with others."10 This definition contemplates
that analysis can be the "product of collaboration among two or more
individuals" of generally available information, "but which reveals
information that is not generally known or available to the public" that
could "provide vital assistance .

.

. in understanding complex schemes

and identifying securities violations."1o' Therefore, "new analysis, even

95. §§ 748, 922, 124 Stat. at 1740, 1842.
96. Proposed Rules Implementing the Whistleblower Provisions of Section 21F of the
Securities Exchange Act (Implementing Whistleblower of SEA), 75 Fed. Reg. 70,488
(proposed Nov. 17, 2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240, 249); Implementing the
Whistleblower Provisions of Section 23 of the Commodity Exchange Act (Implementing
Whistleblower of CEA), 75 Fed. Reg. 75,728 (proposed Dec. 6, 2010) (to be codified at 17
C.F.R. pt. 165).
97. Implementing the Whistleblower SEA, 75 Fed. Reg. at 70,519; Implementing the
Whistleblower CEA, 75 Fed. Reg. at 75,745.
98. Implementing Whistleblower of SEA, 75 Fed. Reg. at 70,489; Implementing
Whistleblower of CEA, 75 Fed. Reg. at 75,729.
99. § 922, 124 Stat. at 1841-42.
100. § 748, 124 Stat. at 1740.
101. Implementing Whistleblower of SEA, 75 Fed. Reg. at 70,492; Implementing
Whistleblower of CEA, 75 Fed. Reg. at 75,729.
102. Implementing Whistleblower of SEA, 75 Fed. Reg. at 70,492; Implementing
Whistleblower of CEA, 75 Fed. Reg. at 75,729-30.
103. Implementing Whistleblower of SEA, 75 Fed. Reg. at 70,492; Implementing
Whistleblower of CEA, 75 Fed. Reg. at 75,731 (internal quotation marks omitted).
104. Implementing Whistleblower of SEA, 75 Fed. Reg. at 70,492; see also Implementing Whistleblower of CEA, 75 Fed. Reg. at 75,729.
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without new facts, can qualify if the whistleblower is the first person to
put together all of the facts and detect the wrongdoing."105
While this definition may seem expansive, it does not include certain
groups of individuals who gain information through performance of an
audit of financial statements required under the securities law governed
by the SEC.o' Furthermore, the Act also excludes individuals who at
the time of acquiring and submitting the original information to the SEC
is an "employee of (i) an appropriate regulatory agency; (ii) the
Department of Justice; (iii) a self-regulatory organization; (iv) the Public
Company Accounting Oversight Board; or (v) a law enforcement
The SEC and CFTC Proposed Rules also include
organization."'
similar limitations.10 Certain information will not be considered to
have "derived from [an individual's] independent knowledge or independent analysis,"o including the following: attorneys and persons who
assist attorneys on client matters; persons who obtain information by
performing an audit; and individuals who receive the information
communicated "with the reasonable expectation that the person would
take appropriate steps to cause the entity to respond to the violation.""o Accordingly, the definition of original information is simultaneously broad in the sense that it expands the type of information that
an individual comes forward with, and narrow in the sense that it limits
the type of individual that brings the information forward.
Exclusive to claims brought by the SEC, Congress has limited what
entity may bring claims against fraudulent actions under the DoddFrank Act to the government alone."' This is unlike the False Claims
To effectively bring claims under the
Act's112 qui tam claims."

105. Securities Law Practice Center, Whistleblower ProtectionsUnder the Dodd-Frank
Act, PRACTICING L. INST., http://seclawcenter.pli.edu/2010/09/09/whistleblower-protectionsunder-the-dodd-frank-act/ (last visited May 2, 2011).
106. § 922, 124 Stat. at 1843.
107. Id. Section 748 precludes an award to any individuals who at the time of
acquiring and submitting the original information to the CFTC is an "employee of (i) an
appropriate regulatory agency; (ii) the Department of Justice; (iii) a registred entity; (iv)
a registered futures association; (v) a self-regulatory organization . ; or (vi) a law enforcement organization." § 748, 124 Stat. at 1741.
108. See Implementing Whistleblower of SEA, 75 Fed. Reg. at 70,522; Implementing
Whistleblower of CEA, 75 Fed. Reg. at 75,746.
109. Implementing Whistleblower of SEA, 75 Fed. Reg. at 70,520; Implementing
Whistleblower of CEA, 75 Fed. Reg. at 75,744.
110. Implementing Whistleblower of SEA, 75 Fed. Reg. at 70,492-93; Implementing
Whistleblower of CEA, 75 Fed. Reg. at 75,730.
111. See § 924, 124 Stat. at 1850.
112. 31 U.S.C. § 3729-3733 (2006 & Supp. 2009).
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Dodd-Frank Act forward, Congress has created a special SEC whistleblower office, the SEC Center for Complaints and Enforcement Tips,114
to be in charge of pursuing the complaints filed by whistleblowers. 1 s
In addition to not providing a qui tam cause of action, the Dodd-Frank
Act also limits a whistleblower's recovery only to cases where, in a
covered judicial or administrative action, the SEC or CFTC monetarily
sanctions the company in violation of the Act in excess of $1 million.116
Under the Dodd-Frank Act, whistleblowers may recover an award for
only those claim that are obtained by the government as part of any
action brought by the SEC "under the securities laws""' or brought by
the CFTC.' The SEC and CFTC Proposed Rules "interpret the term
'action' to mean a single captioned civil or administrative proceeding."119
While the Act does provide a mandatory award to a whistleblower that
provides original information, the Act limits the amount of recovery that
a whistleblower can be awarded to between 10%-30% of the monetary
sanction.12 0 The SEC and CFTC Proposed Rules add that in a case of
multiple whistleblowers entitled to an award, the Commission "independently determinels] the appropriate award percentage for each whistleblower, but total award payments, in the aggregate, will equal between
10 and 30 percent of the monetary sanctions collected .*..."21 Addi-

tionally, both the Proposed Rules anticipate that the percentages
awarded in one action may differ from the percentages awarded in
related actions. 1 22 The Dodd-Frank Act requires the SEC and CFTC
to consider numerous factors in determining the percentage of the
award, including the significance of the information provided, the degree
of assistance the whistleblower provided, and the level of government

113. Compare § 924, 124 Stat. at 1850 (creating a separate office to pursue whistleblower claims) with 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b) (2006) (allowing qui tam claims to be brought by
an individual).
114. See U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, http://www.sec.gov/complaint
.shtml.
115. § 924, 124 Stat. at 1850.
116. §§ 748, 922, 124 Stat. at 1740, 1841.
117. § 922, 124 Stat. at 1841.
118. § 748, 124 Stat. at 1740.
119. Implementing Whistleblower of SEA, 75 Fed. Reg. at 70,498; Implementing
Whistleblower of CEA, 75 Fed. Reg. at 75,743.
120. §§ 748, 922, 124 Stat. at 1740-41, 1842-43.
121. Implementing Whistleblower of SEA, 75 Fed. Reg. at 70,499, 70,521; Implementing
Whistleblower of CEA, 75 Fed. Reg. at 75,738, 75,746-47.
122. Implementing Whistleblower of SEA, 75 Fed. Reg. at 70,499,70,521; Implementing
Whistleblower of CEA, 75 Fed. Reg. at 75,738.
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interest in deterring such violations.123 Notably, the Description of the
Proposed Rules by the SEC includes whether "a whistleblower reported
the potential violation through effective internal whistleblower ...
Additionally, the SEC
procedures" as a factor in the determination."
Proposed Rules allow a whistleblower who reported first internally and
then, within 90 days, externally to the SEC, to relate back to the date
of the whistleblower's internal report.125 Likewise, a similar factor is
in the Proposed Rules by the CFTC.1 26
The monetary award determined by the SEC cannot be appealed
unless the award is less than 10% or more than 30%.121 In order to
receive the award, the SEC and CFTC Proposed Rules require first that
the award be published on the Commission's website-thereby giving
"notice" of the action and sanctions to the public-once the judicial and
administrative action results in the imposition of monetary sanctions
exceeding $1 million.'" The claimants must file their claim for an
award within sixty days of the date the notice is published on the
website, otherwise the claimant is barred from recovering an award.1 2
In order to make a claim for an award, the claimant must submit a form
declaring, among other things, the eligibility of the whistleblower to
receive an award.'" Additionally, and in accordance with §§ 922 and
748 of the Dodd-Frank Act, an anonymous whistleblower must reveal his
identity to receive his award. 31
While both the CFTC and SEC begin the award determination process
after the time for filing any appeals of the Commission's judicial or
administrative action has expired, 3 2 the SEC and CFTC differ in their

123. §§ 748, 922, 124 Stat. at 1741, 1842-43.
124. Implementing Whistleblower of SEA, 75 Fed. Reg. at 70,500.
125. Implementing Whistleblower of SEA, 75 Fed. Reg. at 70,516.
126. See Implementing Whistleblower of CEA, 75 Fed. Reg. at 75,733.
127. § 922, 124 Stat. at 1844.
128. Implementing Whistleblower of SEA, 75 Fed. Reg. at 70,523; Implementing
Whistleblower of CEA, 75 Fed. Reg. at 75,746. However, under the SEC Proposed Rules,
if the monetary sanctions are obtained without a judgment or order, like when a
contribution is made pursuant to Sarbanes-Oxley § 308(b), then the notice would be
published within thirty days of the deposit of monetary sanctions that exceeds $1 million.
Implementing Whistleblower of SEA, 75 Fed. Reg. at 70,523.
129. Implementing Whistleblower of SEA, 75 Fed. Reg. at 70,523; Implementing
Whistleblower of CEA, 75 Fed. Reg. at 75,746.
130. Implementing Whistleblower of SEA, 75 Fed. Reg. at 70,523; Implementing
Whistleblower of CEA, 75 Fed. Reg. at 75,746.
131. §§ 748, 922, 124 Stat. at 1742, 1843-44; see also Implementing Whistleblower of
SEA, 75 Fed. Reg. at 70,523; Implementing Whistleblower of CEA, 75 Fed. Reg. at 75,746.
132. Implementing Whistleblower of SEA, 75 Fed. Reg. at 70,523; Implementing
Whistleblower of CEA, 75 Fed. Reg. at 75,746.
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claim review process-the SEC Proposed Rules provides an administrative appeal."as Under the Dodd-Frank Act, if the award by the SEC is
outside the 10%-30% range, then the award may be appealed to a United
States circuit court of appeals within the circuit where the alleged action
occurred or where the complainant resided on the day of the violation.'3 However, a decision regarding "whether or to whom to make
an award may be [appealable to an appropriate court of appeals] within
30 days after the Commission issues its final decision."1'3 Alternatively, an award determined by the CFTC may be appealed regardless of
whether the award was within the 10%-30% range.1 36 Accordingly, the
SEC has proposed an administrative appeals process unique to the
SEC"a' because Congress did not provide a claimant with an appeal
similar to the one provided to claims brought in the CFTC.1as
The process begins when the SEC makes a "Preliminary Determination" over whether the claimant is entitled to an award and, if so, the
proposed award percentage amount."3 ' The SEC Proposed Rules
provide an administrative appeals process that allows the claimant the
opportunity to contest the preliminary determination by requesting,
within thirty days, the information the Commission used to determine
the amount and requesting a meeting with the Whistleblower Office.'40
If a claimant fails to timely respond to the preliminary determination
and accordingly fails to exhaust administrative remedies, then the
claimant would be prohibited from pursuing a judicial appeal.'41 If the
claimant does timely respond, the claims review staff would consider the
issues and grounds advanced in the claimant's response and prepare a
"Proposed Final Determination." 4 2 Thereafter, a Commissioner could
request that the proposed final Determination be reviewed by the
Commission, and after review, issue its "Final Order." 3 However, if

133. See Implementing Whistleblower of SEA, 75 Fed. Reg. at 70,523.
134. § 922, 124 Stat. at 1844; see also Implementing Whistleblower of SEA, 75 Fed.
Reg. at 70,524-25.
135. Implementing Whistleblower of SEA, 75 Fed. Reg. at 70,524.
136. § 748, 124 Stat. at 1742.
137. Implementing Whistleblower of SEA, 75 Fed. Reg. at 70,523.
138. See § 748, 124 Stat. at 1742.
139. Implementing Whistleblower of SEA, 75 Fed. Reg. at 70,523.
140. Id. The requested meeting by the claimant, however, is not required, as the SEC
has the discretion to decline this request. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 70,523-24.
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a Commissioner does not make this request, then the proposed final
determination becomes a "Final Order of the Commission."
Under the Dodd-Frank Act, a known whistleblower is permitted, but
not required, to be represented by counsel."4 " However, if a whistleblower chooses to remain anonymous, the whistleblower must retain an
attorney, 146 and "the attorney's contact information [must] be provided
to the Commission" so as to "prevent fraudulent submissions and to
facilitate communication and assistance between the whistleblower and
the Commission's staff"147 Accordingly, the whistleblower does not
need to appear as a party in the case and can remain anonymous as an
informant.4 4 However, if the whistleblower chooses to remain anonymous, then the whistleblower is required to be represented by counsel
under the Act and must disclose his identity prior to the payment of the
award."' However, the SEC and CFTC Proposed Rules authorize
disclosure in certain situations such as when disclosure is required in
federal court or in an administrative action. 5 0
There are several procedural requirements in the Proposed Rules that
a whistleblower must follow for submitting original information and
making a claim for a whistleblower award to the SEC and CFTC.'"
The Proposed Rules include provisions that are designed to aid the
Commissions in evaluating and using the information provided, such as
providing explanations and additional information regarding the
submitted information. 5 2 Additionally, both Proposed Rules require
that the whistleblower submit information under the penalty of
In the instance of an anonymous whistleblower, the
perjury."5 '
attorney must certify that he has verified the whistleblower's identity
and eligibility before an award is appropriate." Overall, the SEC and

144. Id. at 70,524.
145. §§ 748, 922, 124 Stat. at 1742, 1843.
146. Id.
147. Implementing Whistleblower of SEA, 75 Fed. Reg. at 70,501;
Whistleblower of CEA, 75 Fed. Reg. at 75,736.
148. See §§ 748, 922, 124 Stat. at 1742, 1843-44.
149. Id.
150. Implementing Whistleblower of SEA, 75 Fed. Reg. at 70,521-22;
Whistleblower of CEA, 75 Fed. Reg. at 75,745.
151. See Implementing Whistleblower of SEA, 75 Fed. Reg. at 70,522-23;
Whistleblower of CEA, 75 Fed. Reg. at 75,745.
152. See Implementing Whistleblower of SEA, 75 Fed. Reg. at 70,522-23;
Whistleblower of CEA, 75 Fed. Reg. at 75,745.
153. Implementing Whistleblower of SEA, 75 Fed. Reg. at 70,522;
Whistleblower of CEA, 75 Fed. Reg. at 75,745.
154. Implementing Whistleblower of SEA, 75 Fed. Reg. at 70,523;
Whistleblower of CEA, 75 Fed. Reg. at 75, 738, 75,745.

Implementing

Implementing
Implementing
Implementing
Implementing
Implementing
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CFTC procedural requirements are important for whistleblowers to
follow as the Commissions will not pay an award to a whistleblower
"who fails to submit information to the Commission in such form as the
Commission may, by rule [or regulation], require."155
The SEC and CFTC Proposed Rules contain a two-step process to
submit original information. 5 6 First, the information must be submitted either on a standard form or through the Commission's online database.15 1 Second, the whistleblower must complete a Whistleblower
Office form and make certain representations regarding the truth of the
information provided.'5 " Again, adherence to these procedural requirements is necessary in order to receive an award.'"'
It is also important to note that under § 748, the CFTC whistleblower
section, the rights and remedies "may not be waived by any agreement,
policy form, or condition of employment including by a predispute
arbitration agreement[,]" and that "[n]o predispute arbitration agreement shall be valid or enforceable, if the agreement requires arbitration
of a dispute arising under this section."' 60 Accordingly, employers will
not be able to compel arbitration of CFTC whistleblower claims.' 6 '
ProtectionAgainst Retaliation
In addition to providing monetary incentives for whistleblowers, the
Dodd-Frank Act also contains protection for whistleblowers against
retaliation by their employers.'6 2 Accordingly, an individual who
provides information to the SEC or the CFTC, or an individual who
assists in any investigation or action of the SEC or the CFTC is
B.

155. §§ 748, 922, 124 Stat. at 1742, 1843.
156. Implementing Whistleblower of SEA, 75 Fed. Reg. at 70,522; Implementing
Whistleblower of CEA, 75 Fed. Reg. at 75,745.
157. Implementing Whistleblower of SEA, 75 Fed. Reg. at 70,522; Implementing
Whistleblower of CEA, 75 Fed. Reg. at 75,745.
158. Implementing Whistleblower of SEA, 75 Fed. Reg. at 70,522; Implementing
Whistleblower of CEA, 75 Fed. Reg. at 75,745.
159. §§ 748, 922, 124 Stat. at 1742, 1843. The Dodd-Frank Act allows information to
be submitted to the Commission after the enactment date of the Act, but before the Rules
are finalized by the Commission. § 924, 124 Stat. at 1850. Accordingly, the Proposed
Rules state that a whistleblower who fell into this category would perfect their status by
submitting the required information within 120 days of the effective date of the proposed
rules. Implementing Whistleblower of SEA, 75 Fed. Reg. at 70,523; Implementing
Whistleblower of CEA, 75 Fed. Reg. at 75,745.
160. § 748, 124 Stat. at 1746; see also Implementing Whistleblower of CEA, 75 Fed.
Reg. at 75,748.
161. § 748, 124 Stat. at 1746; see also Implementing Whistleblower of CEA, 75 Fed.
Reg. at 75,748.
162. See § 748, 922, 124 Stat. at 1744, 1845.
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protected against retaliation.'6 3 It is important to note that the DoddFrank Act does not completely usurp Sarbanes-Oxley's administrative
process; rather, it creates an entirely new and separate enforcement
mechanism for retaliation claims that parallels the existing regime
Therefore, the Dodd-Frank Act simultaunder Sarbanes-Oxley."
neously enhances the protections available to whistleblowers under
Sarbanes-Oxley but also creates a separate enforcement mechanism for
claims brought under the SEC or CFTC.
1. Dodd-Frank Act Retaliation Protection, SEC & CFTC. First,
the Dodd-Frank Act provides retaliation protection against an employer
who "may discharge, demote, suspend, threaten, harass, directly or
indirectly, or ... discriminate against, a whistleblower ... because of
any lawful act done by the whistleblower . . . ."16 Specifically, the
Dodd-Frank Act protects an employee who provides information to the
SEC166 or OFTC;167 who initiates, testifies in, or assists in any investigation or judicial administrative action of the SEC; " who assists in
6
who makes disclosures to the SEC
any investigation of the CFTC;e'
required under Sarbanes-Oxley or "any other law, rule, or regulation
subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission." 70 This final protection
under the SEC allows for whistleblowers to bring retaliation causes of
action under the Dodd-Frank Act when the disclosures are protected and
required under Sarbanes-Oxley."' As mentioned above, the SEC and
CFTC Proposed Rules include the word "potential" to the type of
violation an employee may report to qualify as a whistleblower.172
Accordingly, the retaliation protection does not depend on whether the
information provided to the SEC or CFTC led to an ultimate adjudicia-

163. Id.
164. Dodd-Frank Act: Enhanced Protection for Whistleblowers Against Employer
Retaliation, COVINGTON & BURLING LLP (July 29, 2010), http://www.cov.com (follow
"Covington E-Alert & Advisory" hyperlink; then follow "2010"hyperlink; then follow "DoddFrank Act: Enhanced Protection for Whistleblowers Against Employer Retaliation"
hyperlink).
165. §§ 748, 922, 124 Stat. at 1744, 1845.
166. § 922, 124 Stat. at 1845.
167. § 748, 124 Stat. at 1744.
168. § 922, 124 Stat. at 1845-46.

169. § 748, 124 Stat. at 1744.
170. § 922, 124 Stat. at 1846.
171. See id.
172. Implementing Whistleblower of SEA, 75 Fed. Reg. at 70,519; Implementing
Whistleblower of CEA, 75 Fed. Reg. at 75,745.
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tion or conclusion that the corporation-employer violated a securities

iaw. 173

Under the Dodd-Frank Act, whistleblowers are given a private right
of action to file an initial complaint of retaliation under the SEC.'. and
CFTC"' in federal district court and accordingly do not have to
exhaust any administrative remedies.176 The statute of limitations for
actions brought under the SEC is no more than six years after the
violation or three years after the right of action is known or reasonably
should have been known by the employee."' However, no action may
be brought more than ten years after the date of the violation."' The
statute of limitations brought under the CFTC is limited to "not ...
more than 2 years after the date on which the violation reported. . . is
committed." 7 1 Once in federal district court, the remedies available
for a successful retaliation claim under the SEC provide a successful
whistleblower up to two times back pay plus interest in addition to being
entitled to reimbursement of reasonable attorney's fees and other costs
of litigation."so The same measures of relief apply to a CFTC claim;
however, the Dodd-Frank Act limits the "amount of back pay to the
amount otherwise owed to the individual."'
The Dodd-Frank Act also provides a new private right of action under
the SEA and the CEA for employees who suffered retaliation as a result
of providing information to the SEC or CFTC.1 82 These causes of
action are separate from an employee's rights under the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act's and the Dodd-Frank Act's whistleblower provisions for financial
services employees and, therefore, may be brought directly into federal
court.s'a Additionally, employees protected by the SEA have up to six
years after the retaliatory conduct, or three years after becoming aware
of such conduct, to bring such a claim." Employees protected by the
CEA, have up to two years to bring such a claim.'

173. Implementing Whistleblower of SEA, 75 Fed. Reg. at 70,489; Implementing
Whistleblower of CEA, 75 Fed. Reg. at 75,745.
174. § 922, 124 Stat. at 1846.
175. § 748, 124 Stat. at 1744.
176. §§ 748, 922, 124 Stat. at 1744, 1846.
177. § 922, 124 Stat. at 1846.
178. Id.
179. § 748, 124 Stat. at 1744.
180. § 922, 124 Stat. at 1846.
181. § 748, 124 Stat. at 1744.
182. §§ 748, 922, 124 Stat. at 1744, 1846.
183. Id.
184. § 922, 124 Stat. at 1846.
185. § 748, 124 Stat. at 1744.
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The Proposed Rules for the anti-retaliation provisions in the SEA and
the CEA are far less extensive than for the rules regarding the
whistleblower awards. Indeed, the comments received in response to the
Proposed Rules on the anti-retaliation provisions are far less than the
amount received in response to the whistleblower awards Proposed
Rules."' One of the requests for comment by the SEC is noteworthy:
the SEC requested comment "on ensuring that appropriate employment
actions ... are not impaired by whistleblower protections and barring
whistleblower protection for frivolous or bad faith claims.""' This is
normally included within other statutes, however, not within the DoddFrank Act.'"
2. Retaliation Protection for Financial Services Employees. In
addition to the retaliation protection for whistleblowers in §§ 748 and
922 of the Dodd-Frank Act, § 1057 creates a private right of action for
employees in the financial services industry who suffer retaliation for
disclosing information of fraudulent conduct related to the offering or
provision of consumer financial products or services.' 8 The retaliation
protection procedure for financial services is different from the procedure
for whistleblowers under §§ 748 and 922.190 First, the statute of
limitation is 180 days, and second, the complaint must be filed with the
Secretary of Labor, rather than in the federal courts.' 9 ' However,
§ 1057 provides a burden-shifting framework that is favorable to
employees, allowing a complainant to prevail by showing by a preponderance of the evidence that the protected activity was a "contributing
factor in the unfavorable personnel action ....
If the Secretary of Labor concludes that there is reasonable cause to
believe that a violation has occurred, the Secretary is required to issue
a preliminary order that may include reinstatement with full back pay,
compensatory damages, and costs."' Within sixty days of the Secretary's findings, any aggrieved party may appeal to the circuit court of

186. David W. Garland & Allen B. Roberts, SECs Proposed Dodd-Frank AntiRetaliationRules: What Is An Employer To Do? (Dec. 20, 2010), http://www.whistleblow
ingcompliancelaw.com/2010/12/articles/restoring-american-financial-s/secs-proposeddoddfrank-antiretaliation-rules-what-is-an-employer-to-do/.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. § 1057, 124 Stat. at 2031-32.
190. Compare § 1057, 124 Stat. at 2032, with §§ 748, 922, 124 Stat. at 1743-46, 184547.
191. § 1057, 124 Stat. at 2032.
192. § 1057, 124 Stat. at 2033.
193. Id.
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appeals where the violation occurred or in the circuit where the
complainant resided on the day of the violation.19 4 If the Secretary has
not issued a final order within 210 days of the filing of the complaint,
the employee can file a lawsuit in a federal district court.195 The
Dodd-Frank Act accordingly creates new causes of action for employment
retaliation that were previously not recognized under Sarbanes-Oxley,
thus giving employees in the financial services industry a cause of
action."'
3. Dodd-Frank Act Amendment to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.
The Dodd-Frank Act's retaliation protections also significantly amends
Sarbanes-Oxley. First, § 929A of the Dodd-Frank Act clarifies a
provision of Sarbanes-Oxley that greatly divided federal courts:9 ' the
whistleblower protection provisions of Sarbanes-Oxley apply to all
This definition includes
employers, not just public companies.'
subsidiaries and affiliates of public companies; therefore, almost every
employee in the financial services industry, whether the employer is
9
publically or privately held, is accorded whistleblower protection.'"
In addition, the Act closes an anti-retaliation loophole in Sarbanes-Oxley
and the False Claims Act by clarifying that whistleblower protections
apply to both parent companies and affiliates whose financial information is included in consolidated financial statements.2 00
Next, two main procedural aspects of the retaliation claim should be
considered. First, the statute of limitations period for which an
employee may pursue a claim for retaliation under Sarbanes-Oxley has
been amended and thus extended under the Act.2 'o Under Sarbanes-

194. § 1057, 124 Stat. at 2034.
195. Id.
196. See generally § 1057, 124 Stat. at 2031.
197. See Fred W. Alvarez et al., The Sarbanes-Oxley Act: Current Issues in Whistleblower Enforcement, 27 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 233, 241-42 (2009). The course of study stated, "Prior
to the administrative review board's ('ARB') decision in Klopfenstein u. PCC Flow
Technologies HoldingsInc., the case law addressing whether subsidiaries could be covered
under SOX was somewhat inconsistent. [Administrative Law judges] applied varying
standards for evaluating coverage, alternately applying a veil-piercing standing, and a joint
employer standard." Id. at 241. However, this conflict was ended when the federal courts
and ARB set an agency standard: "to obtain coverage under SOX, the non-public subsidiary
must act as an agent of the publicly-traded parent, and the agency must relate to
employment matters." Id.
198. See § 929A, 124 Stat. at 1852.
199. See id.
200. See id.
201. See § 922, 124 Stat. at 1848.
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Oxley, the statute of limitations was 90 days;202 however, the Act
amended, and accordingly increased, the statute of limitations under
Sarbanes-Oxley to 180 days.20 3
The Act also amends Sarbanes-Oxley in two more respects. Section 922
of the Act expands whistleblower rights to pursue litigation.'" The
Act states that whistleblower rights and remedies under Sarbanes-Oxley
"may not be waived by an agreement, policy form, or condition of
employment," and prohibits enforcement of any pre-dispute arbitration
agreements requiring arbitration of a Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblower
dispute.2 05 Finally, the Act clarifies that jury trials are available for
actions brought in a federal court under Sarbanes-Oxley.206
IV.

COMPARING THE DODD-FRANK WHISTLEBLOWER PROVISIONS
TO THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT, FALSE CLAIMS ACT,
AND SARBANES-OXLEY

Dodd-FrankAct Versus the Securities Exchange Act
The Dodd-Frank Act 207 creates new whistleblower incentive programs and new private causes of action under the SEA,208 for whistleblowers.20 This addition to the SEA provides the incentive for "whistleblowers to report perceived wrongdoing to the [SEC] rather than to the
employer. 21 0
Most notably, the type of claims for which a whistleblower may receive
an award under the Act are far more expansive than the previous
provision in the SEA.211 Prior to the Act, a whistleblower under the
SEA would only recover in an instance of insider trading.212 However,
under the Dodd-Frank Act, a whistleblower may recover an award
obtained by the government as part of any action brought by the SEC

A.

202.

203.

§ 806(a), 116 Stat. 745, 803 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(bX2XD) (2006)).
§ 922, 124 Stat. at 1848.

204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
208. 15 U.S.C. ch. 2B (2006 & Supp. 2009).
209. § 922(a), 124 Stat. at 1841; Miranda Tolar, Whistleblower Claims in the Corporate
Context: An Employer'sPerspective, ASPA'rORE, Nov. 2010, availableat 2010 WL 4774893,

*3.
210. Tolar, supra note 209, at *3.
211. Compare §§ 748,922, 124 Stat. at 1740, 1841, with 15 U.S.C. § 78u-1(aXl)(2006).
212. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-1(aX1).
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"under the securities laws""' or an action under the CEA214 brought
by the CFTC. 215 Additionally, the minimum amount awarded to
informants under the Act is the maximum awarded amount under the
SEA.2 16 Under the Act, a whistleblower stands to gain between 10%
and 30% of the monetary sanctions imposed;21" whereas, under the
SEA, the percentage for recovery cannot exceed 10% of the monetary
sanctions imposed.218
Finally, the Dodd-Frank Act also provides retaliation protection for
employees who report fraudulent activity under the SEA.219 While this
provision does not amend the SEA, the Dodd-Frank Act nevertheless
provides retaliation protection.220
Dodd-FrankAct Versus False Claims Act
The Dodd-Frank Act's whistleblower bounty provisions can be
contrasted most sharply with the False Claims Act'S22 1 whistleblower
provision. First, contrary to the Dodd-Frank Act's expanded definition
of "original information" to include individuals with either information
or analysis,22 2 the False Claims Act's comparable definition of "original
source" is limited to an individual with "direct and independent
knowledge. 22 3 Accordingly, "original source" as defined under the
False Claims Act is more narrow than the definition of original
information under the Dodd-Frank Act; the False Claims Act's definition
does not include the ability to recover based on an analysis alone.224
Further, the phrases "exclusively derived" and "a source" are not
included within the False Claims Act's original source provision and
225
again indicates an expansion of the pool of SEC whistleblowers.
Another area where the Dodd-Frank Act contrasts with the False
Claims Act is in what entity can pursue a cause of action. The DoddFrank Act only gives the government the cause of action to pursue a
B.

213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.

§ 922, 124 Stat. at 1841.
7 U.S.C. ch. 1 (2006 & Supp. 2008).
§ 748, 124 Stat. at 1740.
15 U.S.C. § 78u-1(e) (2006).
§§ 748, 922, 124 Stat. at 1741, 1842.
15 U.S.C. § 78u-1(e).
See § 922, 124 Stat. at 1845-46.
Id.
31 U.S.C. § 3729-3723 (2006 & Supp. 2009).
§§ 748, 922, 124 Stat. at 1740, 1842.

223. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(eX4XB) (2006).
224. Id.
225. Id.; cf §§ 748, 922, 124 Stat. at 1740, 1842.
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securities fraud claim.226 Alternatively, the False Claims Act authorizes both the government and individual relators to pursue the claims; the
latter claimant securing the private right of action after the government
chooses not to pursue the claim.227 However, under the Dodd-Frank
Act, claims are pursued by a special SEC whistleblower office;2 %
whereas, in the False Claims Act, the claims are administered and
enforced by either the Department of Justice Civil Division attorneys or
by local Assistant United States Attorneys.229 The practical significance of this change has yet to be seen; however, it is likely to provide
greater amounts of resources for the government to pursue these claims.
Additionally, the Dodd-Frank Act imposes a significant limitation to
potential whistleblower recoveries, while the False Claims Act does not
have a similar limitation.so Under the Dodd-Frank Act, a whistleblower may only recover an award if the monetary sanction exceeds $1
million.2"' The False Claims Act, in contrast, does not mandate that
the sanction meet a monetary threshold.23 2 Finally, while the factors
to determine the amount of recovery are the same as in the False Claims
Act, the Act requires the SEC or CFTC to determine the allocation of
that recovery, not the court or the parties, as required by the False
Claims Act.233
C.

Dodd-FrankAct Versus Sarbanes-OxleyAct
A great deal of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 234 was amended by the DoddFrank Act; however, there are a few significant differences that remain.
First, the resulting scope of the protected disclosures underlying the
retaliation cause of action is broader in the Dodd-Frank Act than the
scope of the protected disclosures in Sarbanes-Oxley because any
retaliation claim that previously could not have been brought under
Sarbanes-Oxley can now be brought under the Dodd-Frank Act."'
Second, Sarbanes-Oxley requires that claimants first exhaust all
administrative remedies with the Occupational Safety and Health

226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
(2006).
231.
232.

See § 922, 124 Stat. at 1841.
31 U.S.C. § 3730(b) (2006).
§ 924, 124 Stat. at 1850.
31 U.S.C. § 3730(a) (2006).
Compare§§ 748, 922, 124 Stat. at 1740, 1841 with 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729, 3730(a), (b)

§§ 748, 922, 124 Stat. at 1740, 1841.
31 U.S.C. §§ 3729, 3730(a), (b).
233. Compare §§ 748, 922, 124 Stat. at 1741, 1842, with 31 U.S.C. § 3730(dX1), (2).

234. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in
scattered sections of 15 and 18 U.S.C.).
235. § 922, 124 Stat. at 1846.
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Administration (OSHA) in the Department of Labor before bringing an
action in federal district court.23 6 In contrast, the Dodd-Frank Act
does not provide any such similar exhaustion requirement, giving the
claimant a private right of action into federal district court.
Third,
the remedies under the Dodd-Frank Act are more expansive than those
under Sarbanes-Oxley. Under Sarbanes-Oxley, a whistleblower who
ultimately succeeds in his claim of retaliation is entitled, among other
Alternatively, a successful
remedies, to back pay with interest.2
whistleblower retaliation claim under the Dodd-Frank Act entitles the
whistleblower to two times the amount of back pay plus interest in
addition to being entitled to reimbursement of reasonable attorney's fees
and other costs of litigation.3
V.

DIscussioN OF INTENDED AND UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES

The Dodd-Frank Actuo will have far-reaching effects not only for the
whistleblowers and companies, but also for any courts and attorneys
involved. While the whistleblower provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act
have potential positive effects on the national financial system, it also
has many potential negative effects for companies. Perhaps scaring
companies and deterring them from fraudulent violations will prove to
be effective; however, it remains to be seen whether a company can
effectively battle against the lottery mentality of its employees. Indeed
even when a company is acting in full compliance with law, the risk
nevertheless remains that uninformed employees may develop concerns
about potential misconduct.
The Effect of Bounty Awards
The Dodd-Frank Act's whistleblower provisions will undoubtedly assist
the government in detecting fraud because of the financial incentives for
whistleblowers to report perceived fraudulent violations. Prior to the
Dodd-Frank Act, whistleblowers' reports already accounted for uncovering over 50% of the fraud schemes discovered in public companies.24 1
Even in the months that followed the enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act,
the SEC "has already received numerous tips from potential whistle-

A.

236. § 806(a), 116 Stat. at 803 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(bX1) (2006)).
237. §§ 748, 922, 124 Stat. at 1744, 1846.
238. § 806(a), 116 Stat. at 803 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(cX2) (2006)).
239. §§ 748, 922, 124 Stat. at 1744, 1846.
240. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
241. S. Rep. No. 111-176, at 96 (2010).
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blowers."24 2 Perhaps the Dodd-Frank Act will increase the likelihood
that not only fraudulent acts by companies will be reported, but that,
even more importantly, companies will be forced to perform better
financing techniques and possibly even proactively self-report.
The obvious implication of the Dodd-Frank Act's whistleblower bounty
provisions is that it will increase the number of employees who report
information to the SEC or CFTC, thus necessarily leading to Congress'
stated intention "[tlo promote the financial stability of the United
States."2 11 Indeed, the Dodd-Frank Act is not just limited to current
and former employees; it is broadly written to include whistleblowers
who are "independent contractors, consultants, joint venture partners,
sales agents, accountants . .. as well as others. . . [who] can gather and
provide original information to government officials ... ."" Thus, by

expanding the amount of people who can report information and who can
earn a hefty financial award, Congress has undoubtedly increased the
amount of complaints that will be turned into the SEC or the CFTC.
The monetary incentive alone would likely provide the "quite large"
potential financial benefit "to stimulate a risk-averse employee to blow
the whistle"24 5 that was missing from other whistleblowing incentive
statutes. 246 This quite large financial award is not overstated. Indeed,
in some instances, it is understated. For starters, the SEC does not
necessarily fine "small potatoes.""' Even though the whistleblower is
entitled to just 10%-30% of that sanction, that award can still, nevertheless, be "staggering."4
Take, for example, the SEC's recent $1.6
billion settlement with Siemens AG (Siemens), the electronics and
engineering conglomerate, involving charges that Siemens violated the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA)249 in 2010.250 Under the boun-

242. Proposed Rules Implementing the Whistleblower Provisions of Section 21F of the
Securities Exchange Act (Implementing Whistleblower of SEA), 75 Fed. Reg. 70,488, 70,504
(proposed Nov. 17, 2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240, 239).
243. § 929, 124 Stat. at 1376.
244. U.S. FinancialReform: New Whistleblower Incentives and Protections,and More
Enforcement Expected, DUANE MORRIS (Aug. 24,2010), httpJ/www.duanemorris.com/alerts/financialreformnewwhistleblower incentives-protections_3772.html.
245. Rapp, supra note 10, at 113.
246. See id.; see also Stauffer & Kennedy, supra note 26.
247. Jesse R. Morton, CanHedge FundsDouble Dip Under Dodd-Frank Whistleblower
Rules?, FIN. REG. F. (Jan. 6,2011, 12:25 PM), http://blogs.reuters.com/financial-regulatoryforum/2011/01/06/can-hedge-funds-double-dip-under-dodd-frank-whistleblower-ruleswestlaw-business/.
248. D. Michael Crites & Joseph C. Krella, Dodd-Frank:Impact of the Whistleblower
Incentives and the Corporate Response, DINSMORE & SHOHL, LLP (Sept. 27, 2010),
http://www.dinslaw.com/doddfranktwhistleblower_incentives/.
249. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 to 78dd-3 (2006).
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ty provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act, an individual who reported to the
SEC that Siemens had engaged in a "systematic practice of paying
bribes to foreign government officials to obtain business"m' would
stand to gain an award of a minimum of $160 million to a maximum of
$480 million.25 2 Likewise, for example, take the $550 million SEC
settlement with Goldman, Sachs & Co. (Goldman) for misleading
investors. 3 Under the Dodd-Frank Act, a whistleblower in this
instance would be awarded anywhere from $55 million to $165
million.25 4 When attaching a number to the award, quite large does
not even come close to describing the amount of recovery a whistleblower
stands to gain.
Furthermore, in addition to the staggering award given to a whistleblower, the amount of money paid to an attorney representing either an
anonymous or non-anonymous whistleblower is also quite large. With
a fee contingent on recovery of "often 40%,",255 an attorney for a DoddFrank whistleblower would make up to $192 million in the Siemens
incident and up to $66 million in the Goldman incident.
On the surface, a statute that awards money to people who "do[ I the
right thing,"2 56 and in turn pays lawyers who help those people to do
the right thing, while sanctioning companies who do the wrong thing,
does not really seem all that terrible. However, as Christopher George
Latore Wallace, a.k.a. Notorious B.I.G., once proclaimed, "It's like the
more money we come across / The more problems we see."
1. Lottery Mentality: Whistleblowers. Playing the lottery entails
adopting the philosophy that there is a chance to instantly win economic
success. 258 Likewise, this "lottery mentality"2 59 has, in the wake of

250. Crites & Krella, supra note 248. The FCPA is a securities law governed by the
SEC, and would fall under the whistleblower provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act. § 922, 124
Stat. at 1841.
251. Crites & Krella, supra note 248.
252. §§ 748, 922, 124 Stat. at 1741, 1842.
253. Crites & Krella, supra note 248.
254. See §§ 748, 922, 124 Stat. at 1741, 1842.
255. Maxwell S. Kennerly, The Idiot's Guide Whistleblowing Under the Dodd-Frank
Wall Street Reform Act, LITIGATION & TRIAL: THE TALES AND TRIBULATIONS OF A
PHILADELPHIA LAWYER (Sept. 10, 2010, 7:39 AM), http/www.litigationandtrial.com/2010/
09/articles/the-law/for-people/the-idiots-guide-whistleblowing-under-the-doddfrank-wall-

street-reform-act/.
256. Rapp, supra note 10, at 112 (internal quotation marks omitted).
257. NOTORIOus B.I.G., Mo MONEY MO PROBLEMS (Bad Boy Records/Arista Records
1997).
258. Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Copyrights as Incentives: Did We Just Imagine
That?, 12 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 29, 51 n.53 (2011).
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the Dodd-Frank Act, already. been adopted by whistleblowers and
attorneys and will fuel the filing of frivolous complaints.2 60 Similar to
playing the lottery, few win; almost all lose.
The considerations behind a whistleblower's decision to report are
undoubtedly complex; however, the principle of a cost-benefit analysis
remains at the foundation of the decision.261 A potential whistleblower
Besides
considers both pecuniary and non-pecuniary elements.6
monetary rewards from the government under the Dodd-Frank Act263
and the False Claims Act,2 " the whistleblower also stands to gain a
book deal, as in the case of the Enron whistleblower Sherron Watkins,26 or a movie deal, like Jeff Wigand of Big Tobacco.266 Additionally, a whistleblower may gain the personal satisfaction that comes
from "doing the right thing."26 7 Organization loyalty and job loss are
large factors that likely make the decision to report substantially
harder.2 66 However, the benefits and protections provided by the
Dodd-Frank Act will substantially change the analysis over the decision
of whether to report. 269 Thus, the financial incentives under the DoddFrank Act may drive an employee to file a claim under the SEC or
CFTC.
The chance of a significant financial gain will likely drive the
whistleblower to report fraudulent activities by an employer corporation.
While in some circumstances, the information reported to the SEC or
CFTC may lead to a finding that the corporation had acted fraudulently;
in other circumstances, the complaint filed by the employee may be
nothing more than frivolous. Both the SEC and CFTC Proposed Rules

259. Philip G. Peters, Jr., Doctors & Juries,105 MICH. L. REV. 1453, 1486 n. 147 (2007)
(internal quotation marks omitted). A lottery mentality is neither a new concept nor one
that is attributed solely to private securities law, it has also been attributed to personal
injury claims in which plaintiffs file frivolous lawsuits with the hopes of winning big at the
cost of practically nothing. Id.
260. Bruce Carton, Pitfalls Emerge in Dodd-Frank Whistleblower Bounty Provision,
SECURITIES DOCKET: GLOBAL SECURITIES LITIGATION & ENFORCEMENT REPORT (Sept. 9,
2010,3:37PM), http://www.securitiesdocket.com/2010/09/09/pitfalls-emerge-in-dodd-frankwhistleblower-bounty-provision/.
261. Rapp, supra note 10, at 111.
262. Id. at 112.
263. § 748, 922, 124 Stat. at 1741, 1842.

264. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(dX1), (2) (2006).
265. See MIMI SWARTz & SHERRON WATKINS, POWER FAILURE:
THE COLLAPSE OF ENRON (2003).
266. See THE INSIDER (Blue Lion Entertainment 1999).
267.

THE INSIDE STORY OF

Rapp, supra note 10, at 112 (internal quotation marks omitted).

268. Id.
269. See id.
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seek to deter this lottery mentality in the latter circumstance by
requiring information submitted to be under penalty of perjury.2 70 But
not all frivolous complaints are untruthful. In the case of a truthful but
frivolous complaint, a non-legal trained employee who is generally aware
of the Dodd-Frank Act and who chooses not to retain an attorney,
evaluates whether the action of the corporation-employer violates
securities law by likely reading the statute. The employee may also be
aware of a sense of urgency to file "original information," recognizing
that filing a truthful but frivolous claim will be at no personal expense.
Finally, the employee is aware, and likely makes the decision not only
to file but to file quickly, because of the potential for a significant
financial award, and thus, is acting under a lottery mentality. In the
end, the complaint filed is considered frivolous; the corporation-employer
did not act fraudulently.
This lottery mentality is accompanied by the reassurance of the DoddFrank Act's retaliation protection and the employee's ability to remain
anonymous if counsel is retained. Accordingly, the Dodd-Frank Act
made the pitfalls of whistleblowing seem meager. Additionally, the SEC
and CFTC's Proposed Rules further the possible truthful yet frivolous
complaint by including the word "potential" in the definition of
whistleblower to describe the type of violation an employee may
report.27 1
Not only will the lottery mentality drive employees to report truthful
but frivolous claims of fraud and other improper conduct, but it will
encourage the employee to file the claim with the SEC or CFTC first,
rather than reporting internally through the company's internal
procedures or guidelines. However, given the significant monetary
awards that employees can now receive under the Dodd-Frank Act, 27 2
the employee is more likely to report externally first. Therefore, the
ethics and compliance programs of reporting fraud internally could be
significantly undermined.
One of the factors included in the Description of the SEC's Proposed
Rules may partially stop the internal reports from being undermined
because the SEC "will consider higher percentage awards for whistle-

270. Implementing Whistleblower of SEA, 75 Fed. Reg. at 70,522; Implementing the
Whistleblower Provisions of Section 23 of the Commodity Exchange Act (Implementing
Whistleblower of CEA), 75 Fed. Reg. at 75,728, 75,745 (proposed Dec. 6, 2010) (to be
codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 165).
271. Implementing Whistleblower of SEA, 75 Fed. Reg. at 70,519; Implementing
Whistleblower of CEA, 75 Fed. Reg. at 75,744.
272. See §§ 748, 922, 124 Stat. at 1741, 1842.
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blowers who first report violations" internally.273 However, this
consideration is a "permissible" consideration and is only included in the
Description of the Proposed Rules, and not the Proposed Rules themAdditionally, the CFTC Proposed Rules regarding the
selves.27'
criteria for the amount of the award includes the exact language of the
correlating SEC Proposed Rules; however, the CFTC does not include
this consideration in CFTC Description of the Proposed Rules.275
Additionally, while both Proposed Rules alleviate pressure for an
employee to report to the SEC or CFTC quickly by allowing the
whistleblower to relate back to the date of reporting internally, this does
not necessarily encourage a whistleblower to internally report first.
Therefore, without a requirement that the whistleblower first report
internally, the internal guidelines and compliance procedures are at risk
of being undermined.
2. Lottery Mentality: The Cottage Industry and Plaintiffs
Attorneys. The Dodd-Frank Act has and will continue to create a
lottery mentality for plaintiff's attorneys. This is most evidenced by the
"cottage industry" that has already been created to assist potential
In the legal
whistleblowers with their SEC or CFTC complaints.7
community, this type of industry emerges when practice groups are
formed to assist plaintiffs in pursuing legal claims, "similar to whistleblower litigation in regulated industries such as pharmaceuticals and oil
and gas."27 7 In the wake of Dodd-Frank, the cottage industry was
quick to emerge where plaintiff's lawyers already specialized in
securities litigation.2 " Additionally, with an easier original information standard for the employee and an easier burden of proof, as well as
a majority of successful claims reaching into the hundreds of millions of
monetary sanctions against companies, attorneys stand to make
considerable profits.

273. Implementing Whistleblower of SEA, 75 Fed. Reg. at 70,500.
274. Implementing Whistleblower of SEA, 75 Fed. Reg. at 70,521.
275. See Implementing Whistleblower of CEA, 75 Fed. Reg. 75,738-39.
276. Ronald D. Orol, Dodd-Frank Spawns Cottage Industry: Law Firms and Swaps
ConsultantsRamp Up to Advise Companies with Statute, MARKET WATCH (Dec. 7, 2010,
6:00 a.m.), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/dodd-frank-spawns-cottage-industry-2010-1207/; see also Kennerly, supra note 255 (encouraging potential whistleblowers to retain
counsel for Dodd-Frank whistleblowing litigation).
277. Adele Nicholas, Whistleblower Provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act Pressure
Employers to Improve Compliance, INSIDE COUNSEL (Oct. 1, 2010), http/www.insidecoun
sel.com/Issues/2010/October-2010/Pages/Whistleblower-provisions-of-the-DoddFrank-Actpressure-employers-to-improve-compliance.aspx?page=2.
278.

Dulce J. Foster,Whistleblower Windfall, FREDRIKSON & BYRON, PA. (Aug. 2010),

http://www.fredlaw.com/articles/investigations/invest_1008_djf.html.
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Based on the aforementioned figures,"' plaintiff's attorneys stand
to make a large amount of money. However, when filing with the SEC,
this may not be necessarily hard-earned money. Unlike the False
Claims Act,280 Congress did not include qui tam provisions that an
employee could bring himself. Instead, Congress created an office within
the SEC to solely handle Dodd-Frank claims.21 The prescribed role
for the attorney is to represent an anonymous or known client and, in
the case of an anonymous client, certify to the SEC, or CFTC, that the
identity of the whistleblower is verified.282 However, the SEC would
likely do most of the investigation as an attorney would not likely
participate in a large part of the litigation.m Accordingly, a simple
cost to benefit ratio analysis demonstrates that an attorney with a 30%50% contingency fee would be receiving a large sum of money for not
actually doing a lot of legal work.
A preliminary glance at the amount of work and risk an attorney
would undergo when filing such claims to the SEC or CFTC on a client's
behalf and the potential for a large financial sum raises an ethical
concern. Under ABA Model Rule 1.5(a), 284 an attorney must charge a
Specifically, one factor used to determine
client a reasonable fee."
the reasonableness of a fee, among others, includes the "time and labor
required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, and the
skill requisite to perform the legal service properly."2 Thus, a large
contingency fee, especially when the work of the attorney is minimal, is
likely unethical.
However, at least one attorney suggests that attorneys will "navigate
the nascent stages of the investigation and. . . put the case together for
the government" because the SEC Center for Complaints and Enforcement Tips will, "as a rule, [be] understaffed and overworked." 2 8 7
Furthermore, an attorney for a client with a successful report would
ensure that the whisteblower's interests are properly taken care of when
the SEC decides his reward. This is especially true considering one of

279. Supra notes 245-55 and accompanying text.
280. 31 U.S.C. § 3730 (2006).
281. § 924, 124 Stat. at 1850.
282. Implementing Whistleblower of SEA, 75 Fed. Reg. at 70,523; Implementing
Whistleblower of CEA, 75 Fed. Reg. at 75,738.
283. Letter from Baker, Donelson, Bearman, Caldwell & Berkowitz, PC, to Elizabeth
M. Murphy, Secretary, Securities and Exchange Commission (Oct. 12, 2010), available at
http://www.sec.gov/comments/df-title-ix/whistleblower/whistleblower-19.pdf.
284.

MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.5(a) (2008).

285. Id.
286.

MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.5(aX1).

287. Kennerly, supra note 255.
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the factors that the SEC must consider is the whistleblower's participation in the investigation. Even so, the reasonableness of a contingency
fee in a case in which an attorney's work is comparatively minimal when
compared to the same fee charged in a qui tam cases8 under the False
Claims Act calls the reasonableness of the fee into question.
The concern regarding the mechanics of a lawyer representing
whistleblowers is not speculation: the Dodd-Frank whistleblower cottage
industry is, even in the early stages, booming, as the "flood[]" of
whistleblowers that go to law firms with whistleblower practice groups
is considerable.2 89 When Erika Kelton, a partner at Phillips & Cohen
in Washington, D.C., was asked compare the surge of tipster calls since
the passage of the Dodd-Frank Act, she replied, "It's not only a different
ballpark, it's an entirely different galaxy."2 90 From the viewpoint of an
attorney, this influx of clients means the increase in revenue, especially
if the costs of actually representing clients is minimal. Accordingly,
attorneys need to remain cautious of filing frivolous claims. This can be
a hard task, not only because attorney's run the grave risk of adopting
the lottery mentality, but also because the nature of the claim, being the
first to file original information, is such an important part of the
complaint process. Attorneys should remember that in cases of
anonymous clients, they must certify the identity of the client to the
SEC or CFTC under the Proposed Rules,2 9' giving them some incentive
to verify the legitimacy of the claims. Additionally, Congress has
expressed concern regarding false reporting and directed the SEC
Inspector General to conduct a study examining "whether the reward
levels are so high as to encourage illegitimate whistleblower claims."292
While the study is not yet released, it remains to be seen whether a
majority of the reports are legitimate.
3. Lottery Mentality: Effect on Companies and Corporations,
and Defense Attorneys. Plaintiffs and their attorneys are not the
only groups that should be concerned about the cottage industry built
around the lottery mentality; nor are whistleblowers the only ones who

288. See, e.g., Roberts Law Firm, False Claims Act Facts: Background, Issues and
2011), http://www.roberts-partners.com/
Impact (last visited Feb. 27,
false claims facts index.html.
289. Kennerly, supra note 255.
290. Sue Reisinger, Firms Face Sudden Rush of Whistleblower Claims, LAw.COM (Sep.
9, 2010) www.law.comjsp/clPubArticleCC.jsd?id=1202471768561 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
291. Implementing Whistleblower of SEA, 75 Fed. Reg. at 70,523; Implementing
Whistleblower of CFTC, 75 Fed. Reg. at 75,738.

292. § 922, 124 Stat. at 1848-49.
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need an attorney. Attorneys for companies and corporations have
already joined the cottage industry by helping companies "adapt to the
new mandates," especially in light of the new monetary incentives for
the employees to report instances of fraudulent conduct."13 However,
this can hardly be seen as purely a monetary motive because companies
stand to lose the most with the enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act.
Recognizing the effect that the Dodd-Frank Act will have on companies,
firms have been diligently issuing client alerts and advisory notices that
provide client-companies with the basic information of the Dodd-Frank
Act and with suggestions on how to avoid whistleblower litigation.294
Regardless, considering the lottery mentality that has likely consumed
employees, avoiding litigation seems unrealistic. Indeed, the suggestions
for helping companies strengthen their internal guidelines and
procedures seem to barely make a dent in stopping the number of
potential whistleblower claims. For example, law firms have suggested
that companies reevaluate their current internal reporting system to
encourage employees to first internally report.9
But even then, a
company is unlikely to provide any sort of incentive equivalent to the
monetary incentives that employees stand to gain. Other suggestions
include taking action to encourage and enhance the general loyalty of
the employees or agents, thus discouraging employees from quietly
working with the government and plaintiff's counsel with an investigation.2 96 While this may have an effect in limited circumstances, a
"large enough financial benefit in favor of blowing the whistle could
outweigh any social or psychological factors favoring silence."
Perhaps the most promising advice for companies is to start where the
problem occurs and focus on the adequateness of their current compliance programs 298 to make it less likely that an employee would violate
the law in the first place by educating employees about the legal requirements.

293. Orol, supra note 276.
294. See Dodd-FrankAct: Enhanced Protectionfor WhistleblowersAgainst Employer
Retaliation, supra note 164; Womble, Carlyle, Sandridge & Rice, LLC, ClientAlert: DoddFrank Solicits Whistleblowers (Sept. 2010), http-//www.jdsupra.com/post/documentViewer
.aspx?fid=57a93ea5-7bOd-4405-ac7f-09a8flf97el5.
295. See, e.g., Womble, Carlyle, Sandridge & Rice, LLP, supra note 294.
296. See, e.g., Obiamaka P. Madubuko, Michael Kendall, Whistleblowers and DoddFrank:Is Your Company Protected?, BOARDMEMBER.CoM, http://www.boardmember.com/
Article-Details.aspx?id=5454 (last visited May 2, 2011).
297. Rapp, supra note 10, at 113.
298. See, e.g., Stauffer & Kennedy, supra note 26; Fueling the FCPA Fire: The DoddFrankAct Whistleblower Provisions,ARENT Fox (July 20, 2010), http://www.arentfox.com
/publications/index.cfm?fa=legalUpdateDisp&contentlid=2565.
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However, regardless of the suggestions offered by lawyers and the
changes implemented by companies, the risk remains that companies
will nevertheless have to endure not only legitimate claims, but also
frivolous claims. Inherent within the increase of claims is the increase
of costs that the company would have to spend to defend claims, even
the frivolous ones. Because of this, a company may be even more likely
to make a preemptory self-report to the SEC or CFTC. Consistent with
Congress's purpose, it is clear that the Dodd-Frank Act may clean up
various companies; however, the bounty provisions of the Dodd-Frank
Act may also end up creating more problems for the legal community
and law-abiding corporations.

B. Changes in Retaliation Claims
There are also several important considerations concerning the DoddFrank Act's employee protection provisions. First, inherent within the
lottery mentality of employee-whistleblowers is the protection that the
Dodd-Frank Act provides against employment retaliation. In addition to
being driven by the monetary incentive, an employer is no longer
concerned about the risk of retaliation for blowing the whistle on an
employer-company.'
The SEC and CFTC Proposed Rules only seek
to make this easier, as the addition of "potential violation" to the
definition of "whistleblower" affords the employee protection regardless
of the adjudication of the matter.o In addition, the Dodd-Frank Act
affords stronger protection by including, among other things, a lengthy
statute of limitations.ox
Furthermore, the Dodd-Frank Act gives a private cause of action to a
whistleblower employee who suffered retaliation from the employer,3 02
unlike Sarbanes-Oxley,30 3 which mandates that an employee exhaust
administrative remedies.'3
By giving plaintiffs a direct access to
federal courts, Congress has further increased the need for attorneys as
well as the amount of claims that federal courts will entertain. In
addition, similar to litigation costs in defending whistleblowing claims,
a company's litigation cost in defending retaliation claims will be
significant. The extensive discovery and motion practice under the

299. Rapp, supra note 10, at 113.
300. Implementing Whistleblower of SEA, 75 Fed. Reg. at 70,519; Implementing
Whistleblower of CEA, 75 Fed. Reg. at 75,745.
301. See § 922, 124 Stat. at 1846.
302. § 922, 124 Stat. at 1846.
303. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in
scattered sections of 15 and 18 U.S.C.).
304. § 806(a), 116 Stat. at 803 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(bX1XB) (2006)).
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federal rules of civil procedure could result in not only higher litigation
costs, but also a greater risk of confidential information being disclosed,
as well as an increase in the possibility of other litigation.
The Dodd-Frank Act's retaliation provisions also allow for a higher
award to whistleblowers who were retaliated against because, under the
Dodd-Frank Act, a plaintiff could be awarded double back pay. In turn,
an attorney's fees will also be higher because of the federal court venue
and the higher back pay awards, of which attorney fees are based.
VI.

CONCLUSION

It is too early to determine the exact ramifications and interpretations
of the Dodd-Frank Act. In recent fashion, Congress has created a broad
statutory charter and will leave it to the regulators to formulate the
rules and the courts to interpret them. However, as more information
is provided and interpreted, it is important to adjust practices of both
law firms and companies to best adhere to the recent developments.
However, it is clear that under the Dodd-Frank Act, a whistleblower
could potentially receive a large monetary award from filing a claim with
the SEC or CFTC, or from a whistleblower's successful employment
retaliation claim. While this has the potential to remedy significant
financial concerns within companies as Congress intended, a lottery
mentality and cottage industry has already emerged in the wake of the
Dodd-Frank Act. The Act certainly provides more than just a sufficient
monetary incentive and strong protections to encourage whistleblowers
to report fraudulent actions. Indeed, the Act provides an award and
protections that is incomprehensible, even fairy-tale like. Yet, the
repercussions of reporting may end up, regretfully, creating a facet of
society driven by greed and the potential for quick wealth. It is this
latter unintended consequence that makes the Dodd-Frank Act seem
almost too good to be true. However, perhaps after looking at the
underlying effects of the Act, things are not always as they seem.
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